13 March 2019, verified Amazon review:
“This is a masterpiece of the ‘Actualities of War’. Ken Privratsky has done an excellent job of recording the superhuman efforts of the logisticians – across all three Services – in the Falklands Campaign of 1982. As history has always shown, soldiers, sailors and airmen can do nothing on courage alone. They must be in the right place, at the right time, with the right weapons, bullets, fuel, equipment, water and rations if they are to function and to have any chance of succeeding in their missions. Those at the ‘sharp end’ may take the glory and one would not take that away from them, but they are only in a position to gain that glory as a result of the unsung heroes who move mountains to provide the wherewithal to do this. Warfare is nothing if it is not consummate team effort. The importance of getting the Logistics right is glossed over in peacetime manoeuvres but every single campaign in history has demonstrated that ignorance of ‘the tail’ leads to failure. Gen Privratsky has reinforced this message masterfully in a factual and highly-readable account of the Falklands Campaign. This book should be a standard (and enforced) text at all Staff Colleges.”
On July 22, 2016, Alaska Dispatch published a feature article on Ken Privratsky and Logistics in the Falklands War in the Culture Section of the newspaper: http://www.adn.com/arts/books/2016/07/21/anchorage-soldier-scholars-book-about-little-known-falklands-war-becomes-surprise-hit-in-military-circles/
From the Dust Jacket by Commodore Michael Clapp, who commanded the Amphibious Task Force:
“With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We should all be grateful.”
From the Foreword by Major General Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and the Land Force:
“Here, at last, is a comprehensive account of the logistics of the Falklands War, from the British point of view, written by a highly experienced American general officer.”
“A well-researched account of logistics in the Falklands War in 1982 is long overdue; and this book will be welcomed by a wide readership, not just logisticians.”
From Colonel Ivar Hellberg, who commanded Commando Logistic Regiment:
“I am indebted to Ken Privratsky for his recent book about the logistics of the Falklands Operation. He has done an excellent job to pull all the strands together and the lessons learned. In many ways I believe that the book has even more credibility, as it is written by a professional military logistician from another country, who can be both objective and honest about some of both our failures and successes.”
From Brigadier Roderick Macdonald, who commanded 59 Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers:
“It is simply the best book I have read on the Falklands War. It reads like a thriller.”
From the Preface by author Ken Privratsky:
“What makes the Falklands War unique in all of military history, however, is what happened in terms of logistics. Never has a nation assembled and deployed forces so quickly to fight a war so far away in an area where it had so little wherewithal. Britain was not ready for this fight in 1982 but still won.”
Former Senior British Army Commander:
“I was absolutely enthralled by your US general’s book on the Log for the Falklands. A brilliant read, and in my opinion, should be required reading for every officer in HM Forces!”
“This is a story of the professionalism and flexibility for the British armed forces to act quickly, for an event they hadn’t pre-planned. The author tells the story in the sequence of the events of the war, but gives a fascinating viewpoint of mixing how events and the need for supply and re-supply played an important part.”
Army Rumour Service:
“This is a highly recommended book. It makes clear the huge amount of improvisation needed to improvise a supply chain that stretched 8,000 miles, the often innovative methods that were required, how problems like the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyer and its cargo impacted on operations and how the campaign was shaped by the logistic limitations and capabilities of the British forces.”
Britain at War:
“Privratsky skilfully looks at each problem, discusses the solution and narrates how the various pieces of the plan worked in action. What comes across very well in this book is the skin-of-the-teeth margin by which some of all this worked.
Major General Privratsky is no stranger to the story of the Falklands campaign and has written papers on the subject, lectured on the Falklands at West Point Military Academy and worked on this book over many years at the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.”
“This book is the first to look in depth at the logistics, the risks and how the British Forces overcame obstacles to defeat a much larger enemy that also enjoyed the advantages that a defender has against an amphibious landing. This book should be compulsory reading… It will certainly be well-received by enthusiasts and professionals. Highly recommended.”
Defense Transportation Journal:
The lessons learned in sustaining a large operation without the benefit of pre-positioned stocks and improved, modern airheads and port facilities are as germane today as they were in 1982. They are of renewed interest to today’s planners and logisticians considering future operations in under-developed parts of the world, and have recently seen increased focus in expeditionary training and at War colleges. Privratsky’s excellent and easily readable book would well serve as text for such studies.
This is a story that needs no embellishment. As a Brit, one reads his understated narrative with a mounting sense of pride and respect. I defy any Brit to reach this and not stand just a little straighter, a little taller.
Marine Corps Gazette:
MG Kenneth Privratsky, USA(Ret), has written a timely and important book on how the British Armed Forces responded to the logistical challenges of projecting power 8,000 miles to conduct a brigade-level, amphibious forcible entry operation to retake the Falkland Islands, thus preventing a major political embarrassment for the United Kingdom . . . this book is not only worthwhile for individual Marines but also one that deserves to be added to the Commandant’s Reading List.
Australian Naval Institute:
Logistics in the Falklands War is, in short, a thorough account of how the British hastily improvised a task force to recapture lost territory. It shows how doing that that was achieved by coordinating civilian and military assets and integrating the civilian assets into a military organisation; it reveals the complexities of managing logistics afloat and ashore and of integrating fundamentally different methodologies; finally, it demonstrates that expeditionary forces, in whatever environment they may deploy, must be self-sustaining, for the logistical line becomes more and more tenuous as the distance from the home base increases. As Privratsky presents the story, one may wonder at the British achievement but also draw discomforting lessons for the present.